Category Archives: Hid card cloner

Hid card cloner

The system boasts a higher level of security through encryption and mutual authentication. But neither of these defenses mean much when the master authentication key used by every standard iClass reader is retrievable by a moderately technical individual. The authentication key is highly sensitive as it allows one to read decrypted card content and also overwrite card content.

This effectively means that an attacker with possession of the authentication key is capable of cloning HID iClass cards and changing configuration settings on the physical reader itself. This method takes advantage of a vulnerability in a specific line of readers released by HID which expose 6 debug pins on the rear of the reader. The Heart of Darkness approach entails leveraging those debug pins to modify the on-board firmware of two vulnerable readers.

By modifying the firmwares, the readers each dump one half of the complete firmware image. The two halves can be stitched together to create a full firmware image which can be used to re-flash the two sacrificial readers.

The only caveat is that it must be Revision A. Revision B or C will not work. These are fairly hard to come by, but if you monitor Ebay or keep a watchful eye on Google, you could get lucky. If you want to replicate the Heart of Darkness method, you will be looking for two of these model numbers:.

In addition, there exists an alternative technique pioneered by proxclone. While this technique seems much easier and less expensive, it's been very difficult to replicate by myself and others.

But if you want to avoid buying a vulnerable reader altogether, I'll be outlining a technique for reverse engineering the master keys from released software, and also reading and writing HID iClass cards without needing the master key. At some point, I received a copy of chinese software used to clone iClass cards after gaining the master key in a more conventional way.

Despite already having the master key, this application presented an interesting challenge. For one thing, the application could only be run if the manufacturer provided USB dongle was attached to the computer. Not only is this annoying, but it also adds to the suspiciousness of the software.

hid card cloner

Unfortunately, I don't have a picture of the dongle and no longer have it in my possession, but it's a rather suspicious looking PCB encased in blue translucent plastic. It emulated an HID device of some kind which also added to its suspiciousness. Obviously, it would be prudent to run the software in a Virtual Machine VM in order to limit the impact it could have on your system. But you'll soon discover that the first hurdle to bypass is virtual machine detection being used in the application.Remember the Cisco fiasco from BlackHat ?

Won't these companies ever learn? HID won't prevent the public from learning about the vulnerability, and they will end up looking like heavy handed goons.

And it's not even secret; Paget demonstrated the attack to me and others at the RSA Conference last month. There's a difference between a security flaw and information about a security flaw; HID needs to fix the first and not worry about the second.

Full disclosure benefits us all. I hope this same mentality doesn't exist in the pharamcuetical industry. Can you imaging doctors hiding an extremely negative side-effect of a certain drug! Hide it from the public and they'll never figure it out right! Even if the chip uses a cryptographically secure challenge-response protocol to prove identity, and if the secret held by the chip cannot be extracted, the system is still vulnerable to the MiG-in-the-middle attack relay attack. HID access cards are in widespread use as building access controls.

These systems keep access logs of "who" which card accessed which door at what time. HID may get away with bullying a small company at a conference. What I don't get is how this is a patent issue. Isn't the point of a patent, that it's clear and in the open - patent, in other words.

Patent protection is meant precisely to increase the amount of public knowledg, by giving sturdier legal protection to published inventions, than to trade secrets.

hid card cloner

I mean, I can see if they thought the particular device he'd constructed infringed on their patents. But giving a presentation that basically just explains how these devices work, doesn't seem to me like it could be a violation of patent. If the patents themselves are written, as they're supposed to be, so that one skilled in the art could reproduce them, then anyone could go to the patent office and get a copy of any information HID is claiming is protected. We cherish innovation. People that question the consequences or future uses of it are doing what the rest are too lazy to do.

It's amazing, but there are people out there who say we don't want to hear about it. But if we don't tell anyone that it's a bad idea to place tripping hazards on the stairs and put extension cords under rugs then the bad guys won't know to place tripping hazards on the stairs or put extension cords under rugs!

Anyone with a Mac look carefully at the latest security patches? A whole bunch of them came out of the Month of Apple Bugs. Recall all the fear-mongering about these pernicious hackers having the audacity to openly disclose these bugs.

Does anyone believe that Apple would have come out with the patches as quickly without public disclosure? I remember that when Periodic was buggy badly, badly testedbut no bug fix came out for!

We're talking about crucial infrastructure for anyone doing more than using a laptop to read blogs. Yeah, I trust industry to do the right thing without a fire under their ass This is silly. You can use patented ideas for search.

You can present research based on patented ideas. You can't use patented info for commercial gain which perhaps, as the presentation could have marketing value for IOactive themselves, might apply tenuously to the presentation. IOactive can't sell such a device or perhaps even plans for such a device but unless they had 'em for sale, no big deal.TechInsider recently posted a video that the company shot with Redteam Securityan online security consulting group, that shows just how easy it is for hackers to not only copy the data on a smart cardbut to also copy that data to a new card to create a fully functional clone.

If you're an employee whose company uses smart cards for access, the video is a bit troubling. For security directors at government organizations, utility companies or organizations dealing in confidential matters, the video is chilling:.

Scary, isn't it? In just seconds, Redteam Security's employees were able to make an exact copy of an employee's access card, essentially giving their team unfettered access to the office after business hours.

After all, the vast majority of cards used for access are RFID cards, namely smart cards. When it comes to the impact a hack like this could have on a company, Tech Insider and Redteam Security showed just how far they were able to get in an article posted back in April.

In the article, Redteam employees detail how they're able to gain nearly unfettered access to the computers and offices of a small power company. With this access, they postured that it may have been possible to get so far into the company's system that they may have been able to shut down the power grid. It's important to note that the above scenario represents an extreme case, and that large utility companies and organizations dealing in confidential information probably have multiple layers of back-up security.

However, the case above does illustrate just how vulnerable RFID cards are to cloning, and how delicate many security systems are. After all, how secure is your system if all it takes for it to be compromised is a man or woman standing near you with a small card reader?

With RFID cards becoming increasingly popular for use as dormitory access cards, apartment building access cards and even home access cards, it's important for users of these RFID cards to protect themselves from security breaches by protecting the cards that leave them vulnerable. The easiest way to protect a card from being cloned or skimmed is actually something we've discussed in this blog before: shielded badge holders.

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Shielded badge holders are card cases or sleeves that contain a thin layer of metal. When the reader sends signals out to try to read the card, it's unable to get through the metal, rendering it unreadable. Had the card in the Tech Insider video been inside of a shielded badge holder, Redteam Security wouldn't have been able to clone it due to the reader's signal being unable to pick up the card's information. It's that simple. By using a shielded badge holder, you're taking important steps to decrease the vulnerability of your RFID cards, thereby increasing the overall security of your facility.

As we stated above, it's important to not get worked up into a hysteria over what Redteam Security was able to accomplish. However, the video does show just how easy it would be for a malicious hacker to gain access to a facility, if he or she had the right tools. If your facility uses RFID smart cards and is worried about the breaches in security that could result from card cloning like the kind that occurred in the video, you can protect your facility with a shielded badge holder.

Topics: tech tipssmart cardscard securitydata securityskimmingRFID cards.You might have heard the stories or seen the YouTube videos of random people hacking electronic access control systems. Inside, find our full test results, including a demo video of how easy it is to do, how widely these cards are deployed, and what steps you can take to cut the risk.

hid card cloner

In our test, we copied multiple kHz formats and tested them on multiple readers. Indeed, to access control systems, these copies look identical to legit cards. The screenshot below, for our test shows that multiple copies are indistinguishable from the HID factory original:.

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The risk is that unauthorized copies can be made and used to gain access, with no outward sign or record of being a duplicate. One specific caveat to this test: not all card types and formats are at risk. Specifically this tool cannot copy any One of the major differences between those formats is However, most kHz formats are simply not encrypted at all.

Reverse Engineering HID iClass Master Keys

This means the process of copying them simply energizes the card, and stores the information it broadcasts. Card details are stored on the card exactly as the system uses them, so sensitive card numbers and facility codes are easy to pull from thin air. Despite the risks of unsecured kHz cards and fobs, they are commonly used and even preferred by many installers and end users. Indeed, these credentials vulnerable to copiers are still used in tens of thousands of systems, with millions of issued credentials circulating every day.

The kit we purchased was shipped with several blank re-writable keyfobs, but were not a suitable blank format needed to copy HID cards. The chilling lesson is these products are very inexpensive, readily available, and sold by multiple vendors eager to ship next day with no questions asked to anyone, crook or honest. The device used to copy the cards works much the same way as normal card readers, with transceiver coil, power supply, IC chip, buzzer and even LEDs components shared by both:.

Given the principal operation of contactless card readers, the copier excites the coil and delivers power wirelessly to the card, which then momentarily stores energy and then uses it to broadcast card details back to the copier. The image below shows a transparent example of a card, revealing all these components:.

The copier includes a small amount of memory to store those details, and then pushes them to a blank card, writing them permanently as a copy. One particular factor of this unit are cards to be copied must be held close to the copying antenna to work, a distance of less than 1". This is somewhat a benefit to cardholders, because someone bent on stealing and spoofing card details must be very close to do it. However, the time needed to steal the information is fast - less than 5 seconds, and it is conceivable that someone could have card details copied and stolen without realizing it, especially in crowded groups of people.

But the method used by this device is available in other forms functional at longer distances - some claiming 5 feet range or more and often using modified off-the-shelf long range readers :. However, carrying the components covertly in a backpack or briefcase means that those stealing cards can just blend in better with crowds. So what can be done to prevent this exploit?

The most straightforward step is to discontinue using HID or any kHz cards, fobs, and readers and switch to encrypted and hashed We bought one of these cheap gadgets, shown below: Inside, find our full test results, including a demo video of how easy it is to do, how widely these cards are deployed, and what steps you can take to cut the risk. Vulnerability Directory For Access Credentials on Feb 20, Knowing which access credentials are insecure can be difficult to see, especially because most look and feel the same.

Even insecure kHz Access Control Door Controllers Guide on Oct 22, Door controllers are at the center of physical access control systems connecting software, readers, and locks. Despite being buried inside But how does How To Troubleshoot Wiegand Reader Problems - Inverted Wiring on Jul 16, Wiegand is the dominant method of connecting access readers, but problems can arise for installers.Has anyone ever experienced this?

I cloned a basic clamshell indala card to a t card with the following commands on the proxmark No beeps, No nothing. The original indala card will atleast get a beep from the multiclass SE reader but the cloned t will not. Strangely I simulated the indala card and placed the proxmark3 antenna to both the printer and multiclass SE Readers and they both recognized successfully. I had done a lf t55 wipe and obviously cleared all the blocks, Where did you get those values from?

Try setting it manually with 'lf t55xx config'. I'm not sure you understand the use of lf t55xx config, and the detect failed indicating either your antenna is not quite strong enough for psk t55xx detection or you are running an older firmware. I'm not sure what you mean by did you try the same blocks 1 and 2 with the second block 0?

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I literrally ran the 3 commands as you descrbied tweaked for newer version syntax. You're right for the lf t55 detect failure, I guess I didn't hold the tag close enough. I just re-ran it and it gave the following. For indala, all you need is the id number.

How to clone a security badge in seconds

But if you'd like you can save a trace with. Test1 lf t55xx wr b 1 d A lf t55xx wr b 2 d a1 lf t55xx wr b 0 d E Test2 lf t55xx wr b 1 d A lf t55xx wr b 2 d a1 lf t55xx wr b 0 d Interesting you say you only need the card number for indala as I've tried just running the indala clone command with the demodulated id and doesn't work.

The proxmark will recognize the card with the id I just set but the printer reader and multiclass reader will not even beep.

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Until someone adjusts the indala cmds to get the correct starting point you can read your tag or load your trace and then do. Note that sometimes you will need a " 1" after the 32 to invert the bits to get the correct look.

Should have a long string of 0s in the binary not 1s. One of the printouts with different offsets should have in the data an A in it - that is the correct block 1. Block 2 will follow. If I understand correctly, block 1 and 2 are in this line?

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Is the point to get these numbers and write to the t? I guess I'm not fully grasping what's going on here. I also found that loading the card dump will only work on the printer reader and not the multiclass reader for whatever reason. I ran the following commands.

Copy or Clone Your Prox HID ID Card

After running those commands the printer reader is able to read the card but the multiclass reader is NOT able to read it at all no beeps.Your question may be answered by sellers, manufacturers, or customers who purchased this item, who are all part of the Amazon community.

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hid card cloner

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Have a question? There was a problem completing your request. Please try your search again later. Compare with similar items. This item Handheld Khz Writable Dual chip Frequency Product information Package Dimensions 5 x 3. Feedback If you are a seller for this product, would you like to suggest updates through seller support? Would you like to tell us about a lower price? See questions and answers. Customer reviews. How does Amazon calculate star ratings? The model takes into account factors including the age of a rating, whether the ratings are from verified purchasers, and factors that establish reviewer trustworthiness.You might have heard the stories or seen the YouTube videos of random people hacking electronic access control systems.

Inside, find our full test results, including a demo video of how easy it is to do, how widely these cards are deployed, and what steps you can take to cut the risk. In our test, we copied multiple kHz formats and tested them on multiple readers. Indeed, to access control systems, these copies look identical to legit cards. The screenshot below, for our test shows that multiple copies are indistinguishable from the HID factory original:. The risk is that unauthorized copies can be made and used to gain access, with no outward sign or record of being a duplicate.

One specific caveat to this test: not all card types and formats are at risk. Specifically this tool cannot copy any One of the major differences between those formats is However, most kHz formats are simply not encrypted at all. This means the process of copying them simply energizes the card, and stores the information it broadcasts.

Card details are stored on the card exactly as the system uses them, so sensitive card numbers and facility codes are easy to pull from thin air. Despite the risks of unsecured kHz cards and fobs, they are commonly used and even preferred by many installers and end users.

Reverse Engineering HID iClass Master Keys

Indeed, these credentials vulnerable to copiers are still used in tens of thousands of systems, with millions of issued credentials circulating every day.

The kit we purchased was shipped with several blank re-writable keyfobs, but were not a suitable blank format needed to copy HID cards. The chilling lesson is these products are very inexpensive, readily available, and sold by multiple vendors eager to ship next day with no questions asked to anyone, crook or honest.

The device used to copy the cards works much the same way as normal card readers, with transceiver coil, power supply, IC chip, buzzer and even LEDs components shared by both:. Given the principal operation of contactless card readers, the copier excites the coil and delivers power wirelessly to the card, which then momentarily stores energy and then uses it to broadcast card details back to the copier. The image below shows a transparent example of a card, revealing all these components:.

The copier includes a small amount of memory to store those details, and then pushes them to a blank card, writing them permanently as a copy. One particular factor of this unit are cards to be copied must be held close to the copying antenna to work, a distance of less than 1". This is somewhat a benefit to cardholders, because someone bent on stealing and spoofing card details must be very close to do it.

However, the time needed to steal the information is fast - less than 5 seconds, and it is conceivable that someone could have card details copied and stolen without realizing it, especially in crowded groups of people.

But the method used by this device is available in other forms functional at longer distances - some claiming 5 feet range or more and often using modified off-the-shelf long range readers :. However, carrying the components covertly in a backpack or briefcase means that those stealing cards can just blend in better with crowds. So what can be done to prevent this exploit? The most straightforward step is to discontinue using HID or any kHz cards, fobs, and readers and switch to encrypted and hashed We bought one of these cheap gadgets, shown below: Inside, find our full test results, including a demo video of how easy it is to do, how widely these cards are deployed, and what steps you can take to cut the risk.

Vulnerability Directory For Access Credentials on Feb 20, Knowing which access credentials are insecure can be difficult to see, especially because most look and feel the same. Even insecure kHz Access Control Door Controllers Guide on Oct 22, Door controllers are at the center of physical access control systems connecting software, readers, and locks.

Despite being buried inside But how does How To Troubleshoot Wiegand Reader Problems - Inverted Wiring on Jul 16, Wiegand is the dominant method of connecting access readers, but problems can arise for installers. In fact, one of the most difficult reader Nortek Blue Pass Mobile Access Reader Tested on Jul 11, Nortek claims BluePass mobile readers are a 'more secure and easy to use approach to access', but our testing uncovered security problems and Nortek Mobile Access Reader BluePass Examined on Feb 12, Nortek's Linear access control division claims to make mobile credentials "more secure and easier to use than ever before" with their BluePass Access Control Records Maintenance Guide on Jan 16, Weeding out old entries, turning off unused credentials, and updating who carries which credentials is as important as to maintaining security as